Introduction
It is paradoxical to think that natural resource riches hurt rather than help an endowed country.
Yet this is precisely the argument that has permeated academic and policy circles for decades. A plethora of papers containing empirical analyses, game theoretic models, and case studies has appeared, attempting to explain why natural resources could be bad for economic growth and development. Some of the more popular explanations involve the Dutch Disease, economic volatility, rent-seeking, and weak institutions, all of which are argued to negatively impact growth.
However, with new empirical evidence and deeper probing into the causes of growth collapse, doubt has begun to build regarding a causal relationship between natural resources and economic growth. A growing literature has arisen involving those who do not subscribe to the theory of a natural resource curse or who believe in a conditional curse. Many success stories have arisen from natural resource wealth. Norway has long utilized its Petroleum Fund to stabilize its oil wealth, providing economic security for the country. More recently, Chile's Copper Stabilization Fund has proven to be a successful element in the country's economic recovery since the mid 1980s. In both cases, resource dependence presented challenges that were properly managed, resulting in economic prosperity. Key challenges in the literature involve disentangling the effect of natural resources from those of other factors which may be correlated with resource abundance but independently affect growth, distinguishing between the direct role that natural resources may play in affecting progress and the way in which it may interact with other determinants, and identifying exogenous sources of variation in resource abundance.
Recent studies have highlighted major differences between performance as measured by the yardstick of economic growth and human development. Rodríguez(2009), Binder and Georgiadis (2010) and Gray and Purser (2009) . Some of these points were raised earlier by Easterly(1999) In particular, there is no significant correlation between per capita income growth and changes in the non-income components of human development, even over relatively long periods of time (up to four decades). While growth was stagnant for the poorest regions like Africa, adult literacy more than doubled and enrolment rates increased by 72 percent over the same period. If countries' performance in growth and human development can be so disparate, one might also expect there to be differences in their correlates.
Building on the empirical and theoretical work done by Daniel Lederman and William F. Maloney (2008) , this paper argues against a natural resource curse not only with respect to GDP growth but most importantly for other dimensions of human development. We show that changes of human development from 1970 to 2005, proxied by changes in the Human Development Index, are positively and significantly correlated with natural resource abundance. While our results are consistent with those of Lederman and Maloney, who find natural resources to be possibly positive for growth, we find strong evidence that natural resources are even better for the human development. This is particularly true for the non-income elements of human development.
This article also takes a close look at the Latin American case. Resource abundance has often been singled out as one of the culprits for the region's poor development. On the other hand, as we will discuss in the next section, there are quite a few cases in which resources have coexisted with strong performance in the region. Are natural resources harming Latin America's development prospects? Anticipating our results, we find evidence that the human development -enhancing effect of natural resources is lower in Latin America than in the rest of the world, suggesting that Latin America may not be fully taking advantage of the possibilities deriving from its factor endowments.
In Tables 1a-b, we present selected summary statistics of the main data we use in this paper, subdivided by countries that are net exporters and net importers of natural resources. 2 2 These are countries that export (import) more than the average. Table 1a shows that compared with all countries, net importers have higher levels in HDI as well as in all of its components. However, looking at changes in variables reveals a somewhat different scenario. Changes in life expectancy are roughly the same across all country groupings. GDP growth has been smaller for net exporter countries, which is at the heart of the natural curse hypothesis. However, changes in the non-income component of HDI, primarily associated with literacy and gross enrolment, are on average larger for net exporting countries. Results are even stronger, in the comparison of changes, if we focus on the high net exporters and high net importers. As we can see from Table 1 .b, all changes are greater for net exporters than net importers except for per capita GDP growth. This potentially indicates that natural resources affect human development primarily through channels other than income. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review of the effect of natural resources on development: the theoretical arguments, different channels of impact, and why natural resources might not be a curse after all. Section 2 contains a special discussion that focuses on a comparative analysis of different growth experiences of Latin America and the rest of the world with respect to natural resources. Section 3 presents our data and empirical methodology. Section 4 discusses our results, which find natural resources to be positively correlated with human development. Section 5 concludes.
Literature Review
Broadly speaking, the resource curse literature has highlighted five channels through which growth may affect human development: Dutch Disease, volatility, trade structure, depletion, and rent-seeking, all of which are complicated by institutional weakness. We discuss each of these in turn.
The term 'Dutch Disease' was initially coined to describe the observed collapse of the Dutch manufacturing sector following the discovery of natural gas in 1959.
3 Sachs and Warner (1995) 's empirical work brought this issue to the front line of the development debate. They showed that countries with a high ratio of natural resources to GDP in their base year, 1970, grew more slowly over the next two decades than their resource-scarce counterparts.
Their analysis is cross-sectional, using the share of GNP in 1970 consisting of primary products to define natural resource abundance, and controlling for other potential growth determinants such as economic openness, rule of law and growth of external terms of trade and found a robust negative relationship between natural resources and growth. Corden (1984) The problems of volatility are exacerbated when an economy is overly dependent on the natural resource industry. and Shaxson (2005) argue that the latter effect arises from multinationals coercing countries into bearing the brunt of the income variability. Volatility has many adverse effects, including making development planning difficult, social spending sporadic, and foreign investors wary. Rodriguez and Sachs (1999) introduce a different channel through which natural resources can appear to damage growth: depletion. Their model shows an underdeveloped country overshooting its steady state during a resource boom. After the initial rise in income, the growth rate turns negative, and the country converges to its steady state from above. Resource revenues consumed by the domestic economy will naturally decrease over time, tending to zero. In this way, after a country enjoys the resource boom, it negatively converges to its overshot steady state. Sachs and Warner's (2005) empirical evidence support this model by finding a negative growth rate associated with natural resource abundance only after an increase in initial wealth.
One important implication is that the observed negative growth is simply the reversion of the positive growth occurring immediately after the boom. Therefore it is a depletion effect, rather than natural resources, that is responsible for the negative growth rates. Rodriguez and Sachs
show that if an economy instead invests its windfall in foreign assets that generate a steady stream of revenue, a negative growth rate can be averted.
argue that a trade structure lacking export diversification hurts growth, not natural resources. To test this theory, they redo the Sachs and
Warner analysis with the inclusion of variables for export concentration and intra-industry trade.
Their findings demonstrate that any negative effect of natural resources on growth disappears in the presence of a variable capturing export concentration. 4 The book suggests that non-renewable natural resource should be viewed as assets rather than production. 5 This is chapter 2 of Escaping the Resource Curse, by Humphreys, Sachs, and Stiglitz. 6 Ch. 2 of Neither Curse nor Destiny
Another channel of particular relevance for natural resource abundant countries is the vulnerability to external shocks and the different productive linkages that an economy has. Hausmann, Rodríguez, and Wagner (2007) show that countries with lower export flexibility -which they measure using an indicator of the density of the product space developed by Hausmann and Klinger(2006) have a harder time recovering from crises caused by export collapses, as it is more difficult for them to move productive resources to a new sector. This is particularly relevant for resource abundant countries as many natural resources, such as oil, are found to occupy areas of low density in the product space.
Jaime Ros (2000) illustrates a contrary case of resources enriching a country when sufficient industrial linkages exists. In these cases, the spending of resource rents can actually have an anti-Dutch disease effect. Two pieces of evidence supporting this thesis are the fact that in countries where natural resources are scarce, one observes stunted industrial development in areas that thrive in resource rich countries, and the fact that Latin America's "primary export phase" was fueled by resource abundance. When proper returns to scale existed in complementary industrial sectors, resource booms fueled major economic expansions.
In the last decade, however, most of the blame for poor growth rates in resource dependent states has been put on institutional weaknesses. A number of these explanations actually emphasize institutional interactions: many have observed (Karl 1997 , Wright and Czelusta 2007 (2009) explains that these are all the result of rival political groups using non-market methods to capture resource rents, another manifestation of the voracity effect. Karl (1997) examines the nature of petro-state institutions in detail. She finds parallel institutions among rent-centered states, whether they be Venezuela, Nigeria, Saudi-Arabia, or even 16 th century Spain. In almost all cases, the state is the direct recipient of the rent wealth, which diminishes the need for taxation. Without taxation, the nature of the social contract between the government and citizens is eroded, while the state can expand its own jurisdiction.
The state's primary purpose becomes spending. Success for businesses, labor organizations, and the middle-class is redefined as the ability to gain or curry political influence.
A significant finding unique to Karl's analysis is that the major failed petro-states, Nigeria, Algeria, Iran, and Venezuela, all had one defining characteristic: they developed their institutions at the same time that petroleum was discovered and multi-national oil companies entered the picture. In many cases, the oil companies helped write the tax laws, and countries' institutions formed around patronage and oil politics. In almost all cases, the state was the direct recipient of the rent wealth. shows that this led to a lack of interest in developing other industries, as demonstrated even in gold and silver rich 16 th century Spain. What resulted in Spain's case similarly developed for these other petro-states: a type of "cultural Dutch Disease."
Further work by Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) shows a direct causal relationship between natural resources and weak institutions. They theorize that natural resources influence growth indirectly through institutions. This would account for the lack of significance for the natural resource variable found in many analyses. Regressing natural resources directly on institutions produced surprisingly strong results. Even when a dummy for oil is included, the impact on institutions is still significantly negative. In fact, they find that once institutions have been controlled for, oil actually has a beneficial effect on growth.
Wantchenkon (2000) empirically demonstrates a causal relationship between natural resources and authoritarianism, finding that natural resources negatively impact democracy. Wantchenkon postulates that authoritarianism arises due to one-party dominance combined with weak rule of law. This incites the opposition to use non-constitutional means to compete for political power.
In response, the incumbent pre-empts this move by repressing or banning the opposition party.
However, when the rule of law is strong and political power is less concentrated, and distribution of resource rents is properly monitored by an independent agency, the incumbent's advantage is largely mitigated. This can be seen in Norway's case. 7 His empirical results show no impact on democracy from natural resources in countries where resource dependence is low (10% or less).
However, when resource dependence is high (90% or more), a one percentage point increase in resource dependence leads to democracy index dropping 2.15%. Diaz employed a system of selective property rights that were quite effective. The scheme secured protection for the economic elites but not for the masses. In fact, this system survived the 18 years of bloody civil war following Díaz's demise, allowing for healthy growth despite the existence of a failed state. Haber et al argue that an oil exporting country's government need not secure credible commitments to everyone. As long as government can make credible commitments to the privileged elites and companies responsible for the majority of economic activity, it is not necessarily imperative for property rights and beneficial institutions to extend to the population as a whole. While securing rights for the entire population is often viewed as a prerequisite for full development, the authors show that substantial growth can be obtained simply by securing property rights for the major oil companies, which requires "neither rule of law nor a stable polity."
Nevertheless, the literature has failed to uncover a significant effect of democracy on growth, so that this is unlikely to be a major channel of transmission.
A number of policies have been suggested to help alleviate any negative effects associated with natural resources. van Wijnbergen (1984) shows that government investment in human capital 7 Haber and Menaldo (2009) reject Watchenkon's findings. 8 This uses 1998 data.
and industries intense in learning-by-doing spillovers will adequately protect a non-resource sector from Dutch Disease effects. Karl (1997) argues that resource dollars must be isolated from the domestic economy by such means as investing internationally, accumulating foreign reserves, and paying off foreign debts. Wantchekon (2000) similarly recommends a "resource fund," modelled on Norway's stabilization fund, as a way to keep resource money from negatively impacting an economy. Collier and Bevan (1996) recommend distributing the revenue directly to the citizenry. Revenue would then be obtained through taxing the citizenry rather than directly through resource rents. This, the authors argue, ensures greater wealth distribution while making the government more accountable to its taxpayers. Martin (2007) 9
With more data available and more sophisticated econometric techniques, it has become easier to tease out the true causes of economic collapse. Lederman and Maloney (2008) 
Latin America: a Regional Comparison
The general conclusion that Maloney (2007, 2008) draw from their analysis is that natural resources are assets for development that necessitate appropriate policies and adequate human and physical capital. They argue that countries can properly employ natural resources to create sustainable economic growth and development through proper export diversification, human and physical capital investment, volatility and real exchange rate control.
Venezuela's case is arguably the best researched in Latin America, with numerous studies and extensive available data. Venezuela's experience with rent-rich resources began with strong growth but was followed by economic deterioration. Venezuela's economy performed strongly in the first half of the 20 th century, boasting the highest growth rate in Latin America. After 1980, however, the country's economy deteriorated, with its non-oil sector growing one fourth the amount of Indonesia's and one sixth that of Mexico's. Rodríguez and Hausmann (2009) show that Venezuela's non-oil economic activity is primarily confined to energy intensive industries, which exploit the same comparative advantage in oil, doing little to protect the economy from its overreliance on petroleum products. Rodríguez and Hausmann (2009) But Venezuela did not always do poorly with oil. Rodríguez and Gomolin (2009) local incomes and standards of living. They argued that these improvements were not the result of an increase in social spending. Instead, they said that the effects resulted from an increase in demand for local inputs.
The oil boom of the 1970s resulted in the greatest reworking of the international economic landscape since the gold rush of the America's in the 16 th century (Karl, 1997 In general, the literature suggests that natural resources can be an important part of the countries pain or prosperity. However, it would be wrong to unequivocally state that natural resources are the reason for a country's woes. Instead, what the case studies suggest is that weak institutions and poor policies make countries vulnerable to the pitfalls presented by natural resources.
Natural resources can also be a blessing, and some countries have used natural resources to fuel unprecedented growth and development.
Data and empirical methodology
Our empirical strategy is similar to that of Lederman and Maloney (2008) , extended in two
directions. First, we analyze the effect of natural resource abundance not only on per capita GDP growth but also on human development. Second, our sample goes from 1970 to 2005, given the newly available dataset of human development developed by Gray and Purser (2009) .
For measuring the natural resource wealth of countries, our primary explanatory variable, there are many possible proxies in the literature. None is perfectly suited to the purpose of estimating coefficients in human development equations. Most scholars measure natural resources as the share of one or more of primary product exports, including agricultural raw materials, food, fuel, ores and metals to GDP (e.g. Nunn, 2008; Sala-i-Martin et al., 2004 and Leamer, 1999) .
However, most of the measures are not necessarily measures of resource abundance, but rather measures of dependence on natural resources. We use Lederman and Maloney's measure of net exports, which applies the primary goods groups of Leamer (1999) . Natural resource exports per worker is our indicators of resource abundance, to which we will refer as the direct effect of natural resources on human development.
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However, as Lederman and Maloney recognize, there could be two flaws with this proxy, both related to consumption. First, income growth increases consumption, which could lead to a bias when estimating the relationship between net exports per labor and income. There is clear empirical evidence of this, demonstrated by a positive correlation of exports and income among net exporters. There is even greater bias when non-resource related sectors cause this increase in income, resulting in a negative correlation of growth and exports. Second, an increase in imports and decrease in exports of natural resources is associated with a rise in capital endowments.
A key advantage of this strategy is that this proxy, unlike other proxies, is positively correlated with natural resource endowment per worker.
Additionally, it has the advantage of being a multi-commodity trade-based proxy, which allows for a larger coverage of countries.
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The following analysis centers on two types of regressions. Our baseline results are generated by running a typical OLS cross-country growth regression, which includes a convergence term, a proxy for the abundance of natural resources, a set of conditional variables, and regional dummies. While with the linear regression we can address the question "on average, are natural resources good for human development?" it cannot answer the other important question: "do natural resources influence human development differently for countries in Latin America?" For To help solve these problems, they use an additional covariate: imports of natural resources per worker, which will measure the indirect effect on natural resources on human development.
While the coefficient of interest remains that of the export variable, the sum of the two coefficients (the sum of the direct and indirect effect) measures the total effect of natural resources on human development. 12 Lederman and Maloney define net exports of natural resources as "exports minus imports of natural-resource-related goods, based on Leamer's commodity clusters." See appendix A for a full description of all variables. 13 This relationship is extracted from the Rybczynski Theorem.
this purpose, we also add to the previous regressions a set of regional dummies interactions and to check for any differential effect of natural resources among regions, particularly among Latin American countries.
One issue that frequently arises with least squares estimations is the role of outliers, posing the question of how to treat some countries' values that differ substantially from other countries'
observations. These deviations can tilt the regression line upwards or downwards, and consequentially, the results can be driven by them (see e.g., Rodríguez, 2007 and Easterly, 2005) . We thus estimate all our regressions eliminating these outliers. In order to do this, we use the dfbeta measure proposed by Besley, Kuh and Welsch (1980) , an influence measure which identifiesthose observations with a significant impact on the results. 
Results
The dfbeta for a predictor and for a particular observation is the difference between the regression coefficient calculated for all of the data and the regression coefficient calculated with the observation deleted, scaled by the standard error calculated with the observation deleted.
Tables 2.a -2.e show the results of our panel regressions with HDI and its subcomponents changes as the dependent variable and natural resource abundance as the key variables of interest. All tables include three specifications that contain a convergence variable in addition to the resource variables along with regional dummies. The second set of specifications, in column two, also contain terms of trade growth and. We also have another set of specifications, in column three, which contain the institutional variable.
OLS (Main results)
In addition to the reported coefficients, significance levels, standard errors, and test statistics, we also calculated standardized regression coefficients in order to examine the relative importance of each variable for determining the growth (changes) in HDI. These so-called beta-coefficients 14 See also Cook and Weisberg (1982) . We restrict our estimations to the cut-off value for the absolute value of DFBETAs being smaller than 2/sqrt(N), where N is the number of observations. make the magnitude of each individual exogenous variable's impact comparable by being unitfree.
Our OLS results indicate that natural resource abundance has a positive effect on human development, since the coefficients for the net exporters of natural resources are positive and statistically significant for all specifications. In analyzing the total effect of natural resources (the sum of the coefficients of net exports and total imports), we found that its effect is positive for both net resource exporting and importing countries, with the effect being stronger for net exporters, as shown by about twice as large standardized (beta) coefficients. Furthermore the statistical significance is more robust for the net exporters, as the total effect of natural resources in determining HDI is statistically significant across all three specifications. Such a consistent result across models was not found for net importers, for whom natural resources are significant only after the inclusion of terms of trade growth. It is important to note that the coefficient for the net imports of natural resources is not significant in any regression. Also, for net importers, the indirect effect of natural resources (measured by the total imports per worker, M/L) is stronger than the direct effect (measured by the absolute value of their net exports of natural resources, NX/L), while for exporters the inverse holds true, indicating that the impacts of natural resources are mostly relevant in those countries where they are abundant.
All three specifications include the initial HDI level of 1970 to test for convergence. The negative and statistically significant coefficients of the initial HDI values of 1970 indicate that there is indeed convergence in human development. In fact the convergence term exerts more impact on human development and all of its subcomponents than any other explanatory variable, as we can see by comparing the absolute value of the beta coefficient.
After convergence, net exports of natural resources is the second most important variable in explaining changes in HDI. An increase of the natural resources exported by net exporters by a factor equivalent to one standard deviation leads to a 0.34 to 0.38 standard deviations increase in the change in HDI, depending on the model. This boost in HDI changes is only about one-ninth that of an equivalent increases by net importers, which implies that the effect of direct resource endowments is important only for net exporters. The reverse applies for indirect effects of natural resources, where only net natural resource importers demonstrate a significant response that is more than twice as strong as the insignificant beta coefficient for net exporters.
The inclusion of the terms of trade growth and institutional variables did not change the joint significance or magnitude of the two natural resource variables for net exporters and net importers, as reflected by the F test for the sum of coefficients.
We now turn to discussing the effects of natural resources on the components of the HDI.
Natural resource abundance measures played a significant and positive role in all literacy models. In fact, both net export and net import as composite measures of the natural resources played a positive and significant role in the determination of literacy. The two other non-income HDI composites, gross enrolment and life expectancy show positive and significant relationships only for some specifications. For life expectancy, the joint effect is positive and mostly significant. Gross Enrolment was negatively and significantly affected by the indirect effect of natural resource endowments for exporters, an effect that is captured in the aggregation of the sum of both exporting coefficients. Both direct and indirect resource variables were negative for almost all specifications for importers. Only in one specification did natural resource abundance show a positive association with gross enrolment on a 10% significance level, and all but one sum of coefficients for either net exporters or importers showed a negative sign.
Regarding the income HDI component, GDP per capita growth shows that natural resource abundance could be a blessing for growth.
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15 This result is similar to that reported by Lederman and Maloney (2008) , with the difference that our sample goes from 1970 to 2005.
In comparing the GDP to the HDI results, we find that the latter is more conclusive in terms or the statistical significance of the direct effect of natural resource abundance. For both the HDI and GDP we find that resource abundance is more important for exporters than importers. However, in the case of GDP, the effect of natural resources through total imports (the indirect effect) is stronger than the direct effect (through net export of natural resources). The standardized coefficients further show that the direct effect of natural resources (NX/L) is important for HDI (by a factor of almost two), while the indirect effect (M/L) is more important for GDP/capita (by a factor of around nine times more).
The previous discussion is illustrated with the following figures (Figures 1 and 2 ), which show a less significant effect of natural resource abundance on GDP growth than on HDI, particularly on the non-income components. Figure 1 Source: Own calculations. These new set of regressions confirm our main results that natural resource abundance has a positive effect on human development, since the coefficients for the net exporters of natural resources are positive and statistically significant for all specifications. Similarly, in analyzing the total effect of natural resources (the sum of the coefficients of net exports and total imports) on human development, we also found that its effect is positive for net resource exporting countries. However, the Latin America interaction effect shows that the impact of natural resources on human development is significantly smaller for this region compared with the rest of the natural resource abundant regions and countries. This result is shown in table 3, where we can see that the Latin America interaction coefficients are of the opposite sign and mostly significant. This indicates that for Latin America the positive effect of natural resources is relatively small and in some cases the total coefficient for the region is not significantly different from zero. 
OLS (Regional interactions results)

Conclusions
This paper shows evidence against a natural resource curse on human development. We find evidence that changes of human development from 1970 to 2005, proxied by changes in the Human Development Index, are positively and significantly correlated with natural resource abundance. When we decompose the results for each HDI components, we find that natural resources could be positive for GDP growth but, most significantly, we find stronger evidence that natural resources are good for the non-income components of human development (especially literacy and life expectancy). These results contribute to a broader discussion of development by indicating that the positive effect of natural resource abundance is clearer for human development than for GDP growth, mainly through the education and health dimensions. The number of students enrolled in primary, secondary, and tertiary levels of education Gray and Purser (2009) Human Development Report Office
